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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j) (2001) (cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court). The 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction was based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2001) 
(appeals from judgments of Utah state district courts over which Court of Appeals lacks 
original jurisdiction). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee Sue Ann Sheville ("Ms. Sheville"), as the guardian of Edwin L. 
Sheville, a protected person, agrees that this Court may properly review (1) whether the 
trial court committed plain error in awarding Ms. Sheville her costs; (2) whether the trial 
court correctly determined that Appellant Sandra Sheville Holman's ("the Appellant's") 
actions in this case were without merit; (3) whether the trial court correctly determined 
that the Appellant's actions in this case were brought in bad faith; (4) whether the trial 
court correctly determined that the Appellant and Mr. David Grindstaff are jointly and 
severally liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) whether 
the trial court correctly determined that the reasonable and proper amount of the 
attorneys' fees and costs awarded to Ms. Sheville is $81,820.41. 
Ms. Sheville disagrees, however, with the Appellant's assertion that Rule 54(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure precludes the trial court's award of costs was properly 
preserved for consideration on appeal. This issue was not preserved in the trial court and 
is therefore waived, as discussed in further detail below. See Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) (refusing to address issue 
not preserved before the trial court). 
Ms. Sheville therefore offers the following statement of issues in lieu of that 
contained on pages 1-3 of Appellant's Opening Brief (hereinafter "Br. of Appellant"). 
This formulation of the issues more accurately captures the arguments presented to the 
trial court and the basis for the court's decision below. 
ISSUE #1 
Was the trial court correct when it determined that the Appellant's actions in this 
case were without merit? Ms. Sheville agrees that this is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
ISSUE#2 
Was the trial court correct when it determined that the Appellant's actions in this 
case were brought in bad faith? Ms. Sheville agrees that this is a question if fact 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203-04 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
ISSUE #3 
Did the trial court commit plain error in awarding Ms. Sheville her costs? This 
question is governed by the standards set forth in State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, 4 P.3d 778 
(to establish plain error, appellant must prove an error exists that should have been 
obvious to the trial court that resulted in harm to the appellant). 
ISSUE #4 
Was the trial court correct when it determined that the Appellant and Mr. 
Grindstaff are jointly and severally liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees 
and costs? Ms. Sheville agrees that this is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
ISSUE #5 
Was the trial court correct when it determined that the reasonable and proper 
amount of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result of the actions of 
the Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff totaled $81,820.41? Ms. Sheville agrees that this is a 
question of fact reviewed for abuse of discretion. Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 
1998). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL 
This appeal turns exclusively upon the interpretation of two statutes authorizing 
the trial court to award attorneys fees and/or costs. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (2001) 
provides that "[I]n civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." Likewise, section 75-1-310 of 
the Uniform Probate Code provides that "[w]hen not otherwise prescribed in this code, 
the court, or the Supreme Court on appeal from the court, may, in its discretion, order 
costs to be paid by any party to the proceedings or out of the assets of the estate as justice 
may require." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant's Statement of the Case is replete with argumentative and factually 
unsupported assertions devoid of any citation to the record. Accordingly, Ms. Sheville 
submits the following Statement of the Case in lieu of that contained in the Brief of the 
Appellant. 
On October 19, 2000, Ms. Sheville filed a Petition for Emergency Appointment of 
Guardianship of Incapacitated Person with the trial court. (R. at 14). On December 19, 
2000, after being twice appointed as temporary guardian, the trial court appointed Ms. 
Sheville as Edwin L. Sheville's ("Edwin's") permanent guardian. (R. at 220-21). On 
January 30, 2001, Ms. Sheville filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (R. at 227). 
On June 5, 2001, the trial court issued a minute entry granting Ms. Sheville's Motion, 
holding that the Appellant's actions in this case were without merit, that she lacked an 
honest belief in the propriety of her actions and undertook activities, including perjury, 
which improperly hindered and delayed Ms. Sheville's physical custody of Edwin and 
her appointment as his guardian. (R. at 338-40). This minute entry was incorporated in 
the trial court's Order dated July 2, 2001, ordering the Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff1 
jointly and severally liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs. (R. at 
342-43). On August 23, 2001, Ms. Sheville filed a Supplemental Motion for Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs. (R. at 348). The trial court granted the Motion on October 24, 2001 and 
1
 Although Mr. Grindstaff filed a Notice of Appeal on July 31, 2001, (R. at 346-47), he 
passed away on January 11, 2002. No briefs have been submitted on his behalf. 
determined that the reasonable and proper amount of the attorneys' fees and costs 
awarded to Ms. Sheville totaled $81,820.41. (R. at 407-09). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ms. Sheville is the daughter and the appointed Guardian of her father, 
Edwin Sheville (R. at 467). 
2. On December 9, 1999, Ms. Sheville took Edwin to his physician, Dr. 
Joseph DeVito, M.D. Dr. DeVito concluded that Edwin was suffering from senile 
dementia, most likely of the Alzheimer's type. (R. at 35-39). Dr. DeVito referred Edwin 
to a neurologist, Dr. Andreas N. Neophytides, M.D., who made a diagnosis of 
microvascular dementia. (R. at 40-43). 
3. Based on his declining health, Edwin signed a durable power of attorney on 
December 23, 1999, appointing Ms. Sheville as his attorney in fact. (R. at 5-7). Prior to 
that time, Ms. Sheville had assisted Edwin with his financial affairs, but had never 
sought, nor been appointed, as guardian or conservator over Edwin. (R. at 468). 
4. On June 2, 2000, at Christiana Care, Dr. Dee Dresser, M.D. evaluated 
Edwin, but did not make any definitive determination that he was competent. Rather, 
Ms. Sheville indicated to a nurse that Edwin had been mildly confused in the past, but 
that, up to that point, he had not appeared incompetent as a result of his confusion. (R. at 
468). 
5. Soon thereafter, Ms. Sheville took Edwin to New York City to live with 
her. During the time Edwin lived with Ms. Sheville, Ms. Sheville was able to further 
witness the point to which Edwin's mental capacity had deteriorated. (R. at 469). 
6. During the time he was living with Ms. Sheville, Edwin indicated that he 
desired his own space. (R. at 469.). Therefore, on June 8, 2000, Edwin checked himself 
into an assisted living center in New York called Prospect Park Residence. (R. at 469). 
7. On October 2, 2000, Ms. Sheville went to the assisted care facility where 
Edwin was living to take him to two doctors' appointments, but she was informed by the 
facility that Edwin had missed two meals and could not be located. After a search of the 
care facility, the police were contacted. (R. at 469). 
8. Ms. Sheville knew nothing of Edwin's whereabouts until a few days later 
when she received a phone call from a realtor who was handling the sale of Edwin's 
Delaware farm, informing Ms. Sheville that she had been contacted by a Salt Lake 
realtor. (R. at 469-70). 
9. Upon discovering that Edwin was in Utah, Ms. Sheville flew to Salt Lake 
to locate him, to take him clothing and medicine, and to check on his well-being. (R. at 
470). 
10. On October 6, 2000, Ms. Sheville arrived in Salt Lake and immediately 
went to the Appellant's home to look for Edwin. (R. at 470). Initially, no one was home. 
When Ms. Sheville returned later, the Appellant was home but received Ms. Sheville in a 
hostile manner. The Appellant said she did not know anything about Edwin's 
disappearance and did not know his whereabouts. (R. at 470). Thereafter, the Appellant 
never notified Ms. Sheville of Edwin's location nor allowed Ms. Sheville to visit him. 
(R. at 470). 
11. On October 10, 2000, Ms. Sheville hired private detective Richard C. 
Romano to assist her in locating her father. (R. at 470). On October 18, 2000, Mr. 
Romano observed Edwin with the Appellant. (R. at 10). 
12. Because Ms. Sheville was being denied access to her father, she filed a 
Petition for Emergency Appointment of Guardian of Incapacitated Person with the trial 
court on October 19, 2000, which precipitated all of the proceedings in this case. (R. at 1-
4). Ms. Sheville was appointed temporary guardian and a hearing on the temporary 
guardianship was scheduled for October 25, 2000. (R. at 11-12). 
13. On October 23, 2000, an ex parte protective order against Ms. Sheville was 
obtained, purportedly at Edwin's request. (R. at 91-94). This protective order was later 
dismissed by the trial court. (R. at 178). 
14. On October 25, 2000 during the hearing on Ms. Sheville's Motion for 
Emergency Appointment of Guardian, the Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff, who represented 
that he was Edwin's attorney, both appeared and claimed that Edwin was competent and 
that he contested the guardianship proceedings. (R. at 473). 
15. Based upon these representations, the temporary guardianship was 
terminated and the parties were referred to mediation. (R. at 22). The trial court also 
appointed Margy Campbell ("Ms. Campbell"), a licensed social worker and gerontologist 
as a court visitor and Dr. Frederick Gottlieb, a gerontologist with the Salt Lake Senior 
Center, as physician, and ordered that Edwin be examined by them. (R. at 22). 
16. The court ordered mediation was held on November 3, 2000. The hearing 
began at approximately 2:00 P.M., and during a caucus at approximately 5:30 P.M., the 
Appellant disappeared with Edwin, thus ending the mediation proceedings. (R. at 473). 
17. On October 31, 2000, Ms. Campbell conducted an initial interview with 
Edwin in her office and scheduled a home visit for November 2, 2000. (R. at 44-49). 
18. During her consultation visit with Edwin on October 31, 2000, Edwin 
indicated that he had liked the New York assisted care facility, his room, the 
socialization, and the food. (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. # 2, at p. 24). 
19. After her October 31, 2000, evaluation, Ms. Campbell concluded that 
Edwin was in need of a guardian and conservator, and a protected, stable environment. 
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2, at p. 17.). Ms. Campbell further testified that it was not 
difficult after a period of time to determine that Edwin was incapacitated, and he was 
clearly unable to track conversations and was suffering from severe dementia. (R. at 413; 
Hearing Trans. #2, at p. 25-26.). 
20. The Appellant contacted Ms. Campbell on the evening of November 1, 
2000, and told Ms. Campbell that Edwin would be unavailable for the home visit on 
November 2, 2000 because he had gone out of town with the Appellant's husband for a 
vacation. (R. at 475). The Appellant also indicated that she too would be unavailable 
because she was joining Edwin and her husband. Ms. Campbell did not schedule another 
2
 For convenience of the Court, Ms. Sheville will refer to the two hearing transcripts in 
the Record as Hearing Trans. #1 for the November 21, 2000 hearing, and Hearing Trans. 
#2 for the November 21, 2000 and December 12, 2000 hearing, as was designated by the 
Appellant. 
home visit at that time because the Appellant did not know when she and Edwin would 
be returning from the vacation. (R. at 475-477). 
21. Based on her interviews and visits with Edwin and his presenting difficulty 
with content focus, short term memory loss and an inability to track basic conversation, 
Ms. Campbell stated that any lay person spending time with Edwin would identify his 
profound incapacity and memory disability. (R. at 476). 
22. Edwin was scheduled to be examined per court order by Dr. Frederick 
Gottlieb on November 10, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. On November 9, 2000 at 4:30 p.m., the 
Appellant called and cancelled the appointment. (R. at 32). 
23. On November 13, 2000, Ms. Sheville filed a Motion for Order Setting 
Deadline for Examination. (R. at 30). 
24. On November 15, 2000, during the hearing on Ms. Sheville's Motion for 
Order Setting Deadline for Examination, the trial court entered an order requiring the 
parties to complete the examinations within 15 days or as soon thereafter as could be 
scheduled. (R. at 50). During the course of this hearing, Mr. Grindstaff disclosed that on 
November 13, 2000, Edwin had engaged in a marital ceremony to a woman named Betty 
Quigley. (R. at 473). 
25. The Appellant introduced Edwin to Ms. Quigley (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. 
#2; at p.69) and acted as a witness to the marriage ceremony. (R. at 315). 
26. After Dr. Frederick Gottlieb finally examined Edwin, he concluded that 
Edwin was incapacitated and had been subjected to undue influence. Dr. Gottlieb also 
suspected elder abuse based upon the way in which Edwin was brought to Utah and his 
subsequent marriage, of which he had no recollection. (R. at 186-192). 
27. On November 17, 2000, Ms. Sheville filed a second Petition for Emergency 
Temporary Appointment of Guardian of Incapacitated Person. (R. at 56-61). Ms. 
Sheville was again appointed temporary guardian and a hearing on this Petition was 
scheduled for November 21, 2000. (R. at 109). A writ of assistance was authorized to 
obtain custody of Edwin. (R. at 106-08). However, the private detectives, constables and 
Sheriffs Department were unable to locate him. (R. at 473-74). 
28. On November 21, 2000, at the hearing on Ms. Sheville's Petition for 
Temporary Guardianship, Edwin did not appear and both Mr. Grindstaff and Appellant 
denied any knowledge of his whereabouts. (R. at 414; Hearing Trans. #1, at p. 3, 10). 
29. During this hearing, the trial court made the following facts: 
[It] appears someone has hidden Mr. Sheville or a person 
with dementia is out there wandering around with a purported 
spouse who may or may not have a better ability to take care 
of herself than he has to take care of himself. [The] 
protective order proceeding was obviously a sham. Whoever 
participated in that was perpetrating a fraud on this court. 
As I indicated earlier, Ms. Holman has taken affirmative 
action to circumvent and avoid complying with Judge 
Peuler's orders. And neither Ms. Holman nor [her daughter] 
appears by their testimony, to have any concern at all about 
the welfare of their father and grandfather. And I don't 
believe their testimony. I'm so finding. 
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2, at pp. 78-79) (emphasis added). 
30. The trial court also stated as follows [With regard to counsel's objections to 
portions of Ms. Sheville's testimony]: "Nothing significant except that it appears that you 
have a client, Mr. Olsen, who's hiding a father from other children." (R. at 413; Hearing 
Trans. #2 at p. 32). 
31. Regarding the Appellant's interference with the guardianship proceedings, 
the trial court also stated as follows: 
[Y]our client has taken affirmative actions to frustrate the 
orders of Judge Peuler. That's the problem we have. She 
ended the temporary guardianship contingent upon the court 
visitor finishing her examination and having a medical 
appointment. Your client has frustrated both those things 
from happening. 
I'm not seeing any improper conduct on the part of anybody 
other than your client and perhaps Mr. Grindstaff is not 
representing his client's best interests. 
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 54.). 
32. During this hearing, the trial court also had the following dialogue: 
The Court: [T]he only person whose conduct is in question, 
as far as endangering him or his assets at this point, is Ms. 
Holman. 
Mr. Grindstaff: I don't understand the asset part, because I 
have never seen her do anything with his assets. 
The Court: Well, there has to be some reason for picking 
him up in New York, hauling him out here with no notice and 
then hiding him from every effort to have this investigation 
that Judge Peuler ordered finished. 
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at pp. 56-57). 
33. The trial court affirmed Ms. Sheville's appointment as temporary guardian 
and ordered the parties to turn Edwin's custody over to Ms. Sheville. (R. at 220-21). 
34. Later that same day, the Appellant located Edwin and turned him over to 
Ms. Sheville at Garden Terrace, where he remained until Ms. Sheville was appointed 
permanent guardian. (R. at 314). 
35. On November 29, 2000, the Appellant filed an Objection to Petition for 
Appointment of Guardian of an Incapacitated Person, wherein she cites her equal 
standing, her ability to care for Edwin and his expressed interest in staying in Utah as her 
criteria for her objection. (R. at 179-80). 
36. On November 30, 2000, attorneys for Betty Quigley, Edwin's purported 
wife, demanded $15,000.00 for damages suffered due to her marriage to Edwin. The 
demand was based in part upon a prenuptial agreement prepared by Mr. Grindstaff prior 
to the marriage. (R. at 236-38). 
37. On December 12, 2000, during a hearing on Ms. Sheville's Petition for 
Guardian of Incapacitated Person, the trial court made the following statement: 
The Court: Mr. Olsen, I'm still considering whether or not 
to report to the DA and ask him to prosecute Ms. Holman for 
perjury and endangering Mr. Sheville. There is no way that I 
would consider her as a potential guardian. Given what I've 
heard this morning and the hearing before. 
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 106.). 
38. Also during this December 12, 2000 hearing, Kent Alderman, counsel for 
Ms. Sheville, had the following dialogue with Edwin: 
Mr. Alderman: Do you know where you are today? 
Edwin: I'm in a Supreme Court in the state of ~ must be 
Delaware. 
Mr. Alderman: Do you know what today is? 
Edwin: I would say it's Monday. I don't know other than 
that. Monday. 
Mr. Alderman: Is there anyone else in the courtroom you 
recognize? 
Edwin: The. . . I think the lady that just stood [referring to 
Holman], I recognize as someone in my past presence of this 
case.. . But I don't know who she is, whether she's a relative 
or not. 
Mr. Alderman: Ed, do you know what a protective order is? 
Edwin: I've heard about it, but I don't know what one really 
is.... 
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2, at pp. 83-86.) 
39. On December 19, 2000, the trial court found Edwin to be incapacitated and 
appointed Ms. Sheville as his permanent guardian. (R. at 220-223). 
40. On January 30, 2001, Ms. Sheville filed a motion for attorneys' fees and 
costs. (R. at 224). In a minute entry dated June 5, 2001, the court made the following 
findings and conclusions: 
1. The Court finds that Ms. Holman's actions in this case 
were without merit. Holman knew or should have known that 
Mr. Sheville was incapacitated and Holman's objections to 
the guardianship proceedings and pursuit of a fraudulent 
protective order were frivolous. 
2. The Court finds that Ms. Holman lacked an honest 
belief in the propriety of her actions and undertook activities, 
including perjury, which improperly hindered and delayed 
Ms. Sheville's appointment as guardian. 
3. The Court finds that attorney David Grindstaff failed 
to ascertain relevant facts and failed to investigate Mr. 
Sheville's competency. Consequently, because Mr. 
Grindstaff clearly acted contrary to his client's best interests, 
he, along with Ms. Holman, shall be jointly and severally 
liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs. 
4. The Court further finds that the attorney fees in the 
amount of $61,780.66 are reasonable and proper. The 
amount of $35,364.92 compensates Sheville for he expenses 
she incurred in defending against Holman "s bad faith claim, 
and the amount of $26,415.74 compensates attorney Kent B. 
Alderman. The Court concludes that the basis for these 
amounts is properly documented and delineated in the parties' 
respective affidavits. 
(R. at 338-339). 
41. On July 5, 2001, the trial court signed an Order granting Ms. Sheville's 
Motion. (R. at 342-43). 
42. On August 23, 2001, Ms. Sheville filed a Supplemental Motion for 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (R. at 348). By Order dated October 23, 2001, the trial court 
granted Ms. Sheville's Motion, awarding Ms. Sheville her attorneys' fees and costs 
totaling $81,820.14. (R. at 407-09). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court was correct in awarding Ms. Sheville, as guardian of Edwin, her 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in regaining custody of Edwin, vacating a fraudulent 
marriage, returning Edwin to his home, and establishing the guardianship. The trial court 
correctly held that the Appellant's actions in this case were without merit and brought in 
bad faith, justifying the award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 78-27-56 of the Utah 
Code. Further, the trial court's award of costs is authorized pursuant to section 75-1-310 
of the Uniform Probate Code. Whether or not Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure applies in this case is not an issue that should be addressed by this Court as the 
Appellant failed to preserve this issue before the trial court. This issue is therefore 
waived. 
It is undeniable that, from the initial stages of the guardianship proceedings and 
continuing thereafter, Edwin was incapacitated and susceptible to undue influence. His 
incapacity was evident to anyone who spent any time talking with him. The Appellant 
knew, or should have known that Edwin was incapacitated and her objections to the 
guardianship proceedings were accordingly without merit. 
The record is replete with further examples of the Appellant's bad faith. For 
example, the Appellant terminated the court ordered mediation without cause, cancelled 
the scheduled examination by the court appointed physician, prevented the completion of 
the examination by the court appointed visitor, participated in the fraudulent marriage of 
Edwin, and participated in the filing of a fraudulent protective order purportedly filed by 
Edwin against Ms. Sheville. Indeed, the trial court recognized that this protective order 
was an attempt by the Appellant to delay and hinder the guardianship proceedings and 
that it was fraud on the court. Thus, it cannot reasonably by disputed that the Appellant 
acted in bad faith, hindering and delaying these guardianship proceedings. 
Because of the Appellant's unconscionable conduct that has delayed and hindered 
the proceedings before the trial court, Ms. Sheville was properly awarded her attorneys' 
fees resulting from the delay and unnecessarily complicated proceedings. The trial court 
correctly determined that Ms. Sheville was likewise entitled to her costs, finding that the 
reasonable and proper amount of these fees and costs totaled $81,820.41, an amount that 
was properly documented and supported before the trial court. The trial court's order 
awarding attorneys' fees and costs against the Appellant should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED MS, SHEVILLE HER 
ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN, § 78-27-56. 
The trial court correctly ordered that the Appellant actions throughout the 
guardianship proceedings were without merit and in bad faith, justifying the award of 
attorneys' fees.3 Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code provides that "[i]n civil actions, 
where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, the court may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to 
the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." The plain 
language of this statute therefore contains two distinct elements to support a fee award. 
First, the action or defense must be without merit. Second, the action or defense must be 
lacking in good faith. Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). The trial court 
correctly concluded that Ms. Sheville met both requirements of section 78-27-56 and its 
Order should therefore be affirmed. 
Ms. Sheville concedes that, pursuant to Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 
1998), costs are not recoverable pursuant to section 78-27-56. As explained in further 
detail below, however, the trial court's award of costs was proper pursuant to the 
Uniform Probate Code. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Held That The Appellant's Actions Were Without 
Merit. 
Pursuant to section 78-27-56, a claim is without merit if it is "'frivolous' or 'of 
little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact.'" Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1983). Subsequent Utah Supreme Court decisions have held claims to be 
meritless even when the claims have had some basis in law or fact. Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998); Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 
1987). In Valcarce, the court concluded "that the trial court properly found the 
[defendant's] actions to be meritless. Although the [defendant's] claims may have had 
some basis in law and they ostensibly provided evidence of their factual claims, the trial 
court found the facts to be contrary to that evidence." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315 
(emphasis added). Likewise, in Topik, the court sustained an award of attorneys' fees 
because it found a defendant had falsely testified regarding his defense. Thus, either false 
testimony or testimony that is not supported by the weight of the relevant evidence is 
considered meritless, as was correctly determined by the trial court. 
It is unmistakable that, prior to, during and throughout the guardianship 
proceedings, Edwin was incapacitated and susceptible to undue influence. The Appellant 
knew or should have known that Edwin was severely incapacitated and her objections to 
the guardianship proceedings were therefore without merit. Before the trial court, and 
again in her Opening Brief, the Appellant offers several reasons why she objected to Ms. 
Sheville's appointment as guardian, arguing that each reason had merit. However, none 
of these reasons form a sufficient basis in law or fact to give her objection any merit 
whatsoever. 
First, the Appellant argues that she has "an equal right to act as the Guardian for 
Edwin L. Sheville in the event a Guardian is required." (Br. of Appellant at 19). This 
reasoning misses the mark. Section 75-5-311 of the Uniform Probate Code established 
the priority for appointment of a guardian. According to this provision, order of priority 
is as follows: first, a statutory nomination by the incapacitated person prior to the 
incapacity; second, a non-statutory nomination; third, the spouse of the incapacitated 
person; and fourth, an adult child of the incapacitated person. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-
5-311 (2001). The Power of Attorney Edwin granted to Ms. Sheville effectively placed 
Ms. Sheville in the second category of priority for guardianship as well as in the fourth 
category. Accordingly, Ms. Sheville, not the Appellant, had priority for guardianship of 
Edwin. An equal right for guardianship only exists if other priorities do no apply. 
Likewise, although the Appellant may have possessed a threshold right, it did not 
authorize the Appellant to misuse that right. Whether or nor she had standing to bring 
her objection does not legitimize her otherwise meritless objection. Standing is only a 
bare right if her underlying claim remains unmeritorious. 
Furthermore, merely because Edwin had not been officially adjudicated 
incompetent, the Appellant did not have the right to ignore the great weight of the 
evidence indicating incapacity. The Appellant argues that she relied on Edwin's medical 
records from June 1, 2000 which stated that Mr. Sheville had only "mild confusion" due 
to an intra cranial hemorrhage, but had "been judged to be competent." (R. at 319). This 
statement, however, is taken entirely out of context and refers to part of the assessment of 
Edwin's competence. The statement appears in the section of the report titled "History of 
the Present Illness" and notes that Edwin's medical history was provided by Ms. Sheville. 
(R. at 319). Ms. Sheville had commented to the nurses that up until the time of his most 
recent episodes, Edwin had experienced problems but still appeared, in her judgment, to 
be competent (R. at 468). Nowhere in the report is there any detailed mental competency 
examination of the type used for determining capacity. 
Indeed, Edwin's medical records from New York, which were filed with the trial 
court early in the proceedings, contain information revealing Edwin's struggles with 
senile dementia of the Alzheimer's type. (R. at 35-43) Further, both Dr. Gottlieb, the 
court appointed physician, and Ms. Campbell, the court visitor, judged Edwin to be 
incapacitated. (R. at 475-76; 186-92). In fact, Ms. Campbell opined that "any lay person 
spending time with Edwin would identify his profound incapacity and memory 
disability." (R. at 476). 
Most convincingly, during the December 12, 2000 hearing before the trial court, 
Edwin was unaware of his very surroundings, he incorrectly identified the day, the 
month, his place of residence, and even the state in which he was located. Nor did Edwin 
know who Mr. Grindstaff was or his role in the proceedings. (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. 
#2 at pp. 83-86). Moreover, Edwin could not properly describe why he was in court that 
day and failed to recognize the Appellant except as someone from his past and then only 
after the Appellant stood up. (Id.). If the Appellant did not know with a surety that Mr. 
Sheville was lacking mental capacity, she should have at least constructively been aware 
of that fact. In either case, when contrasted against the great weight of the evidence, her 
purported belief does not make her objection any more meritorious. 
The Appellant also claims that she had a factual basis for asserting in her objection 
to Ms. Sheville's petition that the Appellant was capable of caring for Edwin, had cared 
for him in the past, and that he desired to remain in the State of Utah and close to the 
Appellant. (Br. of Appellant at 20). A review of the record, however, demonstrates 
otherwise. In fact, as set forth above, during the December 12, 2000 hearing, Edwin 
himself contradicted this assertion. Edwin identified the Appellant as a person "from his 
past" whom he did not recognize. (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at pp. 83-86). The 
Appellant was obviously not a person with whom he had spent a significant amount of 
quality time as she would suggest. Further, at no time did Edwin ever testify during the 
proceedings that he disliked or distrusted Ms. Sheville. Moreover, the Appellant offers 
no evidence from Edwin, Ms. Campbell, or any physician in either New York or Utah to 
substantiate these allegations. Rather, she presents only her hearsay account of Edwin's 
purported conversations. As such, there is no credible evidence to support this claim. 
The trial court also held that the Appellant's pursuit of the frivolous protective 
order purportedly filed by Edwin against Ms. Sheville was fraudulent. (R. at 338). The 
Appellant asserts that the protective order was entirely Edwin's idea. (Br. of Appellant at 
22). Edwin's own testimony, however, demonstrates otherwise. When asked in court if 
he knew what a protective order was, he could not give a cogent answer: 
Q. [Edwin], do you know what a protective order is? 
A. I've heard about it, but I don't know what one really is. 
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 86). In contrast, the Appellant's name and that of her 
husband curiously appear on the protective order as protected parties. (R. at 91). 
Although the Appellant may not have technically moved for the protective order, it is 
apparent that she nonetheless participated in bringing it. The Appellant's purported 
explanations for her actions in this case are simply not supported by the weight of the 
relevant evidence in this case. The trial court's holding that her actions were without 
merit should therefore be affirmed. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Held that the Appellant's Actions in this Case 
Were Brought in Bad Faith. 
In its June 5, 200t Minute Entry, the trial court correctly held that the Appellant 
"lacked an honest belief in the propriety of her actions and undertook activities, including 
perjury, which improperly hindered and delayed Ms. Sheville's appointment as 
guardian." (R. at 338). This entry was incorporated in the trial court's July 2, 2001 
Order. (R. at 343). The record reflects an abundance of evidence supporting this finding, 
and the trial court's Order should therefore be affirmed. 
To prove that a party acted in bad faith, a court must find that one of the following 
factors existed: (1) the party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in 
question; (2) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) the 
party intended to act or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would 
hinder, delay, or defraud others. Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
Further, material misrepresentations and a disregard for truth evidence a lack of honest 
belief by a party in the propriety of its actions. See Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Under this analysis, the Appellant's lack of candor with the trial 
court is sufficient to uphold its finding of lack of honest belief on her part. 
In the instant case, the trial court expressed serious concerns about the truthfulness 
of the Appellant's own testimony, going so far as to consider reporting her to the district 
attorney for perjury. (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2. at p. 106). Further, during the course 
of the proceedings, the Appellant claimed and represented to the trial court that Edwin 
was competent, kept Edwin's whereabouts hidden from Ms. Sheville (R. at 470), 
cancelled appointments with Ms. Campbell and Dr. Gottlieb (R. at 475-77; R. at 32), 
arranged for Edwin to participate in a questionable marriage (R. at 315; 413; Hearing 
Trans.#2 at p. 69), and likely participated in filing a fraudulent protective order. The trial 
court recognized the Appellant's lack of candor and bad faith numerous times throughout 
the proceedings. For example, during the November 21, 2000 hearing, the trial court 
made the following findings: 
[It] appears that someone has hidden Mr. Sheville or a person 
with dementia is out there wandering around with a purported 
spouse who may or may not have a better ability to take care 
of herself than he has to take care of himself. [The] 
protective order proceeding was obviously a sham. Whoever 
participated in that was perpetrating a fraud on this court. As 
I indicated earlier, Ms. Holman has taken affirmative action 
to circumvent and avoid complying with Judge Peuler's 
orders. And neither Ms. Holman nor [her daughter] appears 
by their testimony, to have any concern at all about the 
welfare of their father and grandfather. And I don't believe 
their testimony. I'm so finding. 
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at pp. 78-80). During this same hearing, the trial court, 
responding to counsel's objections to portions of Ms. Sheville's testimony, stated, 
"Nothing significant except that it appears that you have a client, Mr. Olson, who's 
hiding a father from other children." (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 32). The trial 
court concluded by finding that the Appellant "has taken affirmative actions to frustrate 
the orders of Judge Peuler." (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 54), and that "the only 
person whose conduct is in question, as far as endangering [Edwin] or his assets at this 
point, is Ms. Holman." (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 56). Finally, and perhaps 
most tellingly, during the December 12, 2000 hearing, the trial court stated that he was 
"still considering whether or not to report to the DA and ask him to prosecute Ms. 
Holman for perjury and endangering Mr. Sheville. There is no way that I would consider 
her as a potential guardian." (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2. at p. 106). 
These findings by the trial court alone are sufficient to affirm its finding of bad 
faith. However, the record reflects additional evidence demonstrating the Appellant's 
obstructionist and bad faith behavior for which the Appellant vainly offers several 
explanations. (See Br. of Appellant at 24-32). Her explanations, however, fail to 
overcome the trial court's finding of bad faith. First, the Appellant claims that she had 
nothing to do with Edwin's departure from New York and travel to Utah. As support for 
this allegation, the Appellant filed an affidavit, wherein she states that she sent Edwin 
$200.00 to see an attorney in Delaware regarding real estate. (R. at 310-17). She further 
states that she was unsure, but Edwin may have used that money to come to Salt Lake 
City. (Id.). Finally, she states that she did not know Edwin was coming to Utah and she 
did not particularly want him to come to Salt Lake. (Id.). The Appellant's own live 
testimony, however, contradicts her statements in her affidavit. For example, during the 
November 21, 2000 hearing, the Appellant testified that she sent Edwin the $200.00 in 
cash for him to come to Utah: 
Q. Did you pay for his transportation? Help? 
A. I did. 
Q. Who did you pay? 
A. I just sent the money to him. 
Q. Did he—did he contact you to do that? 
A. Yes. He said that he wanted to meet me halfway. 
Q. How much cash? 
A. I sent him $200. 
Q. And then he made the arrangements, is that what you 
are telling me? 
A. Yes. 
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at pp.62-63). Contrasting the Appellant's testimony at this 
hearing with that provided in her affidavit, it is clear that the Appellant intended Edwin to 
come to Utah, that she wanted him to come, and that she sent him money for 
transportation to come and not for an attorney as she contended in her affidavit. Further, 
according to Edwin's medical reports, Edwin lacked the medical capacity to form the 
intent to leave New York and travel to Utah, much less the capacity to actually carry out 
such a plan. 
The record additionally reflects ample evidence that the Appellant intentionally 
delayed visits with the court visitor and physician. Ms. Campbell, the court appointed 
visitor, conducted an interview with Edwin in her office on October 31, 2000 and 
scheduled a home visit for November 2, 2000. (R. at 475-76). The Appellant contacted 
Ms. Campbell on the evening of November 1, 2000 and told Ms. Campbell that Edwin 
would be unavailable for the home visit on November 2 because he had gone out of town 
with the Appellant's husband for a vacation. (Id.). The Appellant also indicated that she 
too would be unavailable because she was joining her husband and Edwin. Ms. 
Campbell did not schedule another home visit at that time because the Appellant did not 
know when she and Edwin would be returning from the vacation. (Id.). However, in her 
affidavit, the Appellant again presents contradicting testimony, explaining that her 
cancellation of Edwin's appointment was necessary for installation of safety equipment 
in the home of her daughter. (R. at 310-17). No mention was made to Ms. Campbell 
about the installation of this safety equipment at the time of the cancellation. 
Likewise, the Appellant explains that she cancelled Edwin's appointment with Dr. 
Gottlieb, the court appointed physician, because Edwin was too sick to meet with him the 
next morning. (Br. of Appellant at 29). This argument is somewhat illogical because 
Edwin was able to see Dr. Fuller the next day. Presumably, Edwin could have received 
the same attention for his ailments from Dr. Gottlieb while complying with the court 
ordered examination. 
The Appellant's attempts to delay and hinder Ms. Sheville's appointment as 
guardian is additionally demonstrated by her actions at the court ordered mediation. 
During a caucus , the Appellant took Edwin and disappeared, failing to return to the 
mediation, and failing to notify opposing counsel or the mediator of her decision to take 
Edwin and leave. (R. at 472-74). The Appellant's self-serving assertions that she 
believed the mediation was over and that Edwin was ill, viewed in light of the 
Appellant's obstructionist behavior throughout the proceedings is highly suspect. 
Finally, despite the undeniable fact that Edwin was incapacitated and suffering 
from dementia, the Appellant participated in the fraudulent marriage of Edwin and Betty 
Quigley. The Appellant contends that she did not exercise any undue influence and was 
not involved in any way in the marriage. However, the Appellant admits that she in fact 
introduced Edwin to Ms. Quigley. (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 69). Furthermore, 
the Appellant attended and acted as a witness at the wedding. (R. at 315). The 
Appellant's vehement denials any involvement in Edwin's wedding is entirely 
implausible given Edwin's obvious incapacity and the fact that Edwin was living in the 
Appellant's home and supposedly receiving her care. Most importantly, Dr. Gottlieb 
reported that during his evaluation, Edwin had no recollection of the marriage or the 
identity of his new wife. (R. at 186-192). In light of this irrefutable evidence, it strains 
credulity to suggest that the Appellant was in no way involved in the marriage. 
The record is filled with example after example of the Appellant's bad faith. Any 
one of these examples is sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding of bad faith. The 
trial court, particularly observant of the Appellant's tactics during the guardianship 
proceedings, correctly determined that her actions amounted to bad faith. The trial 
court's Order should therefore be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS IS AUTHORIZED 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 75-1-310 OF THE UNIFORM PROBATE 
CODE, 
The trial court properly awarded Ms. Sheville her costs pursuant to section 75-1-
310 of the Uniform Probate Code. This section provides that "[w]hen not otherwise 
prescribed in this code, the court, or the Supreme Court on appeal from the court, may, in 
its discretion, order costs to be paid by any party to the proceedings or out of the assets of 
the estate as justice may require." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-310 (2001). This statute 
grants specific statutory authority for a court to award a party its costs. 
The Appellant complains that the trial court erred in awarding Ms. Sheville her 
costs because of the alleged failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 54(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, because the Appellant failed to preserve this 
issue at the trial court, it is not properly before this Court for consideration. Moreover, 
this argument ignores the fact that the trial court did not have to rely on Rule 54(d) for an 
award of costs, but could instead utilize section 75-1-310 of the Uniform Probate Code as 
the basis of the award. 
A. The Appellant Did Not Preserve Issues Involving Rule 54(d) Before The Trial 
Court 
In her brief, the Appellant argues that the plain language of Rule 54(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure bars Ms. Sheville's right to recover the costs and attorneys' fees 
awarded by the trial court. This argument, however, is irrelevant in light of the 
undeniable fact that the Appellant failed to preserve this issue before the trial court. As 
stated by this Court, "[I]ssues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion are deemed 
waived, precluding the appellate court from considering their merits on appeal." 
LeBaron & Associates v. Rebel Enterprises. 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The Utah Supreme Court has mandated that for a question to be considered on appeal, 
"the record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot merely assume that it was properly 
raised." Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 
1983) (emphasis added);. Further, "[t]he burden is on the parties to make certain that the 
record they compile will adequately preserve their arguments for review in the event of 
an appeal." Id. 
For example, in James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this Court 
considered whether the plaintiff had sufficiently raised the claim of equitable mortgage at 
trial to preserve the issue on appeal. The plaintiff had obliquely raised the issue in his 
complaint and the plaintiffs counsel made two brief references to the theory during the 
bench trial. This Court held that these references were insufficient to have raised the 
issue below, holding: 
[The plaintiff] supplied no legal authority dealing with 
equitable mortgages nor any showing of the relevance of the 
facts to an equitable mortgage theory during the course of the 
trial. The trial court made no ruling as to the existence of an 
equitable mortgage and [the plaintiff] made no objection to 
this omission. . . . For an issue to be sufficiently raised, even 
if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of 
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it. 
Id. at 802. Likewise, in Franklin Financial 659 P.2d al 1045, the appellant argued that 
the trial court incorrectly awarded summary judgment to the appellee because, among 
other alleged errors, the contract at issue had been amended, creating a new and separate 
agreement. The Supreme Court, however, refused to consider this issue, holding that 
"[a]though it is conceivable, but not likely, that the argument was raised orally in the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, there is nothing whatsoever in the record 
to support that possibility, and there is no such contention in appellants' briefs." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Franklin Financial is strikingly similar to the instant case. Here, the Appellant 
acknowledges that she made no mention of Rule 54(d) in any of the briefs or filings 
before the trial court. The Appellant, like the appellants in Franklin Financial 
nonetheless argues that this issue was properly preserved because the Appellant's counsel 
raised this argument during oral argument. (Br. of Appellant at 13). Tellingly, however, 
the Appellant fails to cite to any portion of the record supportive of this self-serving 
assertion. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Franklin Financial 659 P.2d 
at 1045, it is the parties' burden to ensure that the record on appeal adequately preserves 
the issues appealed. As the record in this case is utterly devoid of any mention of Rule 
54(d) or its application to this case, that issue is not properly before this Court for 
consideration. 
Moreover, even assuming that this issue was mentioned during oral argument, the 
judge was presented with no legal authority in which to make an informed and reasoned 
ruling on this issue. Oblique references to this argument during the hearing are not 
enough to raise the issue "to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can 
consider it." James, 746 P.2d at 802. As there is no record of this issue ever being raised 
below, the issue of Rule 54(d) is therefore waived. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Plain Error In Awarding Ms. Sheville Her 
Costs. 
To establish the existence of "plain error" and obtain relief from an alleged legal 
error that was not properly preserved at the trial court, the appellant must show, "(i) an 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome." State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, ^ 1, 4 P.3d 778. The Appellant cannot meet 
these criteria because even if Rule 54(d) precludes the award of costs in this case, the 
Uniform Probate Code specifically authorizes such an award, precluding the finding of 
any error or prejudice suffered by the Appellant. A party in a proceeding governed by 
the Uniform Probate Code is therefore not precluded from obtaining costs despite any 
alleged failure to adhere to the requirements of Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The court in a guardianship proceeding retains jurisdiction over the guardian 
and ward until the guardian is discharged. Further, the guardian has an ongoing duty to 
collect and protect the assets of the ward, including any claims tbeward may have against 
any person who has caused harm to the ward or his estate. 
In addition, as the Probate Code provides statutory authority for award of costs in 
this case, the Appellant's reliance on Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) and 
its progeny is misplaced. Under Frampton, costs under Rule 54(d) means those fees 
"which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and which the statutes 
authorize to be included in the judgment." Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. Such a narrow 
definition makes sense in normal civil litigation. However, guardianship cases differ 
significantly from general civil litigation, making the analysis in Frampton inapplicable. 
In guardianship cases, unlike civil litigation, the primary party involved is incapable of 
defending himself. As explained by section 75-1-310 of the Utah Probate Code, the court 
can, in its discretion, award costs. In the instant case, it was appropriate for the trial court 
to order that the Appellant pay Ms. Sheville's costs. It would be entirely inappropriate to 
charge Edwin's estate for the costs incurred by his agent under her power of attorney, his 
guardian and daughter, Ms. Sheville, in locating, recovering and returning Edwin to his 
home in New York. Indeed, as the court in Frampton recognized, "the trial court can 
exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance of costs; and that it has a duty to 
guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof." Frampton v. Wilson, 605 
P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980). 
In the instant case, the costs awarded by the trial court are not excessive but rather 
are wholly contemplated by the distinctive nature of the guardianship proceedings, as 
explained above. In fact, the costs incurred by Ms. Sheville would not have been 
incurred but for the actions of the Appellant in removing Edwin from New York, 
bringing him to Utah and hiding him, and participating in Edwin's marriage to a friend of 
the Appellant, all in a vain attempt to gain control of his assets. The trial court 
committed no error in awarding costs to Ms. Sheville and its order should accordingly be 
affirmed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THE APPELLANT AND MR. 
GRINDSTAFF JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR MS. 
SHEVILLE'S ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. 
The trial court correctly held the Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff were jointly and 
severally liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs. The Appellant 
complains that Ms. Sheville's affidavits are insufficient because they do not break down 
into separate categories the damages resulting from the Appellant's behavior as opposed 
to Mr. Grindstaff s behavior. (Br. of Appellant at 32-37). In support of her argument, 
the Appellant cites to Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998), which requires 
apportionment between parties and costs in attorney fee disputes. However, the analysis 
in Foote is limited in application to situations where the party seeking an award of fees 
was successful on some, but not all claims. Indeed, Foote involved several opposing 
parties and several unsuccessful claims. Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d at 55. Furthermore, 
even where a party is only successful on some claims, that party may still be 
compensated for all claims that are "inextricably tied together" or "which are so closely 
related," that they require proof of the same facts. Brown v. Richards, 978 P.2d 470, 475 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999); see also First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 486 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1996). 
The Appellant contends that Ms. Sheville is not entitled to attorneys' fees incurred 
in filing the original Petition for Emergency Appointment as Guardian or the filing of the 
Petition for Permanent Appointment as Guardian because Ms. Sheville would have 
incurred those fees regardless of the Appellant's conduct. (Br. of Appellant at 35). The 
Appellant further contends that she is not responsible for fees incurred by Ms. Sheville in 
defending the Protective Order or the Annulment of Ms. Sheville's marriage because she 
was not involved in either. (Br. of Appellant at 35-36). These assertions are erroneous. 
Ms. Sheville was forced to file her Petitions for Guardianship because of the Appellant's 
conduct and participation in bringing Edwin to Salt Lake City and hiding him from Ms. 
Sheville. Furthermore, as explained above, the evidence demonstrates that the Appellant 
was indeed involved in the sham protective order as well as Edwin's marriage. 
The proceedings before the trial court centered on determining Edwin's capacity 
and if found incapacitated, whom should be appointed as his guardian and conservator. 
Ms. Sheville was twice appointed temporary Guardian and eventually permanent 
Guardian of Edwin. Further, Ms. Sheville successfully opposed the Appellant's own 
Petition for Guardianship and a fraudulent protective order. Clearly, in the proceedings 
at issue, Ms. Sheville prevailed on all of her claims. Thus, the requirements for 
apportioning under Foote do not apply in this case. 
Similarly, as a basis for their involvement in the guardianship proceedings, both 
the Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff contended that Edwin was competent and both the 
Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff contended that Ms. Sheville should not be appointed 
guardian. Consequently, Ms. Sheville was able to use the same facts and evidence to 
prevail against both parties simultaneously. As a result, the requirements for 
apportionment do not apply to this case and there are no deficiencies in the 
documentation that prevented the trial court from awarding Ms. Sheville's costs and fees 
against the Appellant. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE REASONABLE 
AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS INCURRED BY MS. 
SHEVILLE TOTALLED $81,820.41. 
The trial court was correct in determining that the reasonable amount of attorneys' 
fees and costs incurred by Ms. Sheville totaled $81,820.41. In determining the 
reasonableness of requested attorneys' fees and costs, Utah courts, "have simply insisted 
that the trial court gear its assessment to accomplish the purpose of attorneys' fees, i.e., to 
reasonably compensate counsel for their time reasonably expended in pursuing the 
underlying case in accordance with the authorizing contract or statute." Foote v. Clark, 
962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1998). Likewise, "[b]ecause the trial court 'is in a better position 
than an appellate court to gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the 
complexity of the litigation,' we have endowed the trial courts with discretion to assess 
the reasonableness of the fees requested under a contract or statute." Id. See also 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998) (holding trial court has discretion 
to determine reasonable attorneys fees because "it is in a better position than an appellate 
court to gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the 
litigation."). In addition, "if reasonable fees are recoverable by contract or statute and the 
trial court considers all pertinent factors and determines in the exercise of its sound 
discretion that a specific sum is a reasonable fee, it is a mistake of law to award less than 
that amount." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). 
Ms. Sheville met the documentary requirements for such an award supporting her 
motion for costs and fees by submitting to the trial court detailed affidavits of attorney 
fees and costs, including invoices and calculations of the amounts sought by her motion. 
(R. at 227-71; 376-90). The Affidavits of Ms. Sheville and her counsel Mr. Alderman 
properly document the necessity for the costs and the reasonableness of the fees incurred 
throughout the proceedings before the trial court. 
The Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 
include findings of fact in its Order documenting its evaluation of the reasonableness of 
the requested fees and costs. (Br. of Appellant at 37-38). This argument is factually and 
legally incorrect. Contrary to the Appellant's suggestions, in the Minute Entry dated 
June 5, 2001, the trial court did indeed make findings of fact supporting its award of 
attorneys' fees and costs. (R. at 338)4. The fact that the trial court's July 2, 2001 Order 
does not contain specific "Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law" does not mean that 
the trial court did not make any such findings. Indeed, the Minute Entry was 
4
 In this Minute Entry, the trial court made the following findings: 
1. The Court finds that Ms. Holman's actions in this case were without merit. 
Holman knew or should have known that Mr. Sheville was incapacitated 
and Holman's objections to the guardianship proceedings and pursuit of a 
fraudulent protective order were frivolous. 
2. The Court finds that Ms. Holman lacked an honest belief in the propriety of 
her actions and undertook activities, including perjury, which improperly 
hindered and delayed Ms. Sheville's appointment as guardian. 
3. The Court finds that attorney David Grindstaff failed to ascertain relevant 
facts and failed to investigate Mr. Sheville's competency. Consequently, 
because Mr. Grindstaff clearly acted contrary to his client's best interests, 
he, along with Ms. Holman, shall be jointly and severally liable for 
payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs. 
4. The Court further finds that the attorney fees in the amount of $61,780.66 
are reasonable and proper. The amount of $35,364.92 compensates 
Sheville for he expenses she incurred in defending against Holman's bad 
faith claim, and the amount of $26,415.74 compensates attorney Kent B. 
Alderman. The Court concludes that the basis for these amounts is 
properly documented and delineated in the parties' respective affidavits. 
incorporated into the Order. In any event, even if the trial court failed to make findings, 
its award could nonetheless be affirmed because, "the Utah Supreme Court has noted that 
section 78-27-56 does not require written findings on bad faith unless the court fails to 
award attorney fees or limits its award of attorney fees." Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 
204 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added); see also Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 421-22 (Utah 1989) (holding section 28-27-56 does not "require 
written findings on the bad faith issue."). As clarified by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 n.l (Utah 1998), "[h]owever helpful such 
findings may be, the failure to enter them, alone, does not warrant reversal." 
Accordingly: 
In cases in which factual issues are presented to and must be 
resolved by the trial court but no findings . . . appear in the 
record, we 'assume that the trier of facts found them in 
accordance with its decision, and we affirm the decision if 
from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to 
support it.' 
Id at 316. (quoting State v Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991)). The record 
demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the 
requested attorneys' fees and costs were reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court's Order 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in awarding Ms. Sheville her attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in locating Edwin, defending a purported protective order, establishing 
temporary and permanent guardianship over Edwin, and annulling his marriage to the 
Appellant's friend. The award of Ms. Sheville's costs was authorized pursuant to section 
75-1-310 of the Uniform Probate Code and the award of fees was authorized pursuant to 
section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code. The trial court correctly determined that the 
Appellant actions throughout the guardianship proceedings were without merit and in bad 
faith. As Ms. Sheville prevailed on all of her claims against both the Appellant and Mr. 
Grindstaff, apportionment was not required and the trial court correctly ordered both the 
Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff jointly and severally liable for reasonable attorneys fees 
and costs totaling $81,820.40. The Order of the trial court should accordingly be 
affirmed in its entirety. 
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